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Abstract
There has been significant recent interest in the role of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) in social movements protesting against authoritarian regimes. Much of the literature on this
topic can be framed in terms of dualities: seeing either technology or (less often) society as the cause of
impacts characterised as either liberation or repression. This paper seeks to move beyond those
dualities by using actor-network theory (ANT) to study the role of ICTs in Iran’s Green Movement;
specifically by applying Callon’s moments of translation.
This analysis turns the focus from causes or impacts of social movements, to the dynamics of their
trajectory. It presents ICTs as an active actor within this social movement of protest; an actor which
rapidly made this movement into a global network. Yet ICTs also betrayed the protest. They
simultaneously worked for the Iranian regime. And they allowed a shallowness of translation which
enabled quick problematisation, interessement and enrolment, but which equally enabled quick deenrolment, and which undermined the full mobilisation of this social movement and ultimately led to its
disintegration.
Recognising the limits but also the originality of actor-network theory, the paper ends by suggesting
directions for future ANT-based work on ICTs and social movements.

Keywords: social movements; actor-network theory; e-democracy; social media

1. Introduction
Social movements can be understood as “networks of informal interaction between a
plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in a political or cultural
conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity” (Diani 1992:13). They can be
traced back many centuries; for example, England’s Peasants’ Revolt of 1381. Social
movements have been particularly associated with the politics of Europe in the 19th
century (for example, the Chartists in the UK in the mid-1800s), with the pre- and
post-Independence eras of nations in the global South (such as the Sarvodaya
democratic movement in India) and with specific issues in the global North (such as
the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s in the US) (Tilly 2004).

Social movements are seen as a universal feature of current societies, with arguments
that they have been catalysed by both globalisation and the spread of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) (Tarrow 2011). The mainstream narrative of
ICTs and social movements has been both positive and tending towards technological
determinism.

Recurrently-cited case studies discuss the Mexican Zapatista

movement’s use of the Internet to attract global solidarity in the 1990s (Van de Donk
et al 2004), the central role of mobile phones in coordination of protests to oust
President Estrada in the Philippines in 2001 (Shirky 2011), and the “Twitter
Revolutions” from Moldova and Iran in 2009 through to the Arab Spring uprisings of
2011 (Mungiu-Pippidi & Munteanu 2009, Stepanova 2011).

Alternatives to or critiques of this dominant narrative have been several; claiming that
the role of ICTs in these social movements has been significantly overstated (van Laer
& van Aelst 2010), that ICTs have been equally used as tools of political repression
by authoritarian regimes (Morozov 2011), and – taking a socially-deterministic
position – that ICTs merely reinforce existing political structures rather than
transforming them (Luke 2006). The relation between ICTs and social movements
remains a topic of active debate with these critiques also being counter-critiqued
(Diamond 2010).

These are dualistic disagreements about the role of ICTs in social movements: the
impacts with which they are associated, and the extent to which technology or other
factors are the cause of those impacts.

At root, they represent different

conceptualisations of the relationship between technology and society. Attempts to
steer beyond these dualisms sometimes focus on impacts, arguing for a mixture of
liberation and repression (Golkar 2011); and sometimes focus on causes, arguing that
impacts derive from a mixed interaction of social and technological factors (Lievrouw
& Livingstone 2006).
Yet there have been criticisms of all these accounts – in terms of their
conceptualisation, their simple association of cause and effect, and their focus on
outcomes rather than process – which prompt a continuing search for alternative
perspectives (Nielsen 2009, Rahimi 2011). In this paper, then, we wish to take a
different path – that laid out by actor-network theory – which seeks to move beyond
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the dualities of technology and society; and beyond conventional notions of cause and
effect, and which helps expose the processes that underpin the trajectory of a social
movement network.

Our main research question is: from an actor-network perspective, what role do ICTs
play in the development of a social movement network? We answer this through the
use of ANT to analyse one particular social movement: the Iranian “Green
Movement” of 2009 that arose following contested presidential elections.

In the next section, we review the literature on ICTs and social movements in more
detail, leading into a brief resumé of key ANT ideas that will be applied here.
Following an overview of our methodology, the main body of the paper is given over
to analysis of the Green Movement framed using Callon’s moments of translation
approach. We end by drawing some conclusions about ICTs and social movements
from an actor-network perspective.

2. Literature Review
As noted in the Introduction, the history of social movements can be traced back
many centuries while the literature on social movements can be traced back several
decades. Early literature drew from social psychology to investigate the motivations
of those involved in social movements (e.g. Cantril 1941, Toch 1965), or from
sociology to study the broader patterns and causes of social movements (e.g. Turner
1969, Oberschall 1973). There has also been a focus on the broader cultural and
political impact of social movements (e.g. Giugni 1998, Tilly 2004).

Within the literature on social movements there has been a continuous interest in the
role of communication networks and the role of the media; seen as fundamental in
both organising and promoting any social movement (Freeman 1999). It is therefore
not surprising that the growing global diffusion of ICTs has prompted an expanding
literature on the relation between ICTs and social movements (McCluskey 2012).
That literature has especially grown with the sense – particularly following the
interpreted experiences in the late 1990s of the WTO meeting protests in Seattle and
the Zapatista movement in Mexico – that ICTs were not merely helpful but central to
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the current organisation and promotion of social movements (Kahn & Kellner 2004,
Chadwick 2006).

Picking up on broader themes within the social movement literature, discussion within
the ICTs and social movement literature can be related to a number of core issues,
including the impacts of ICTs and the causes of those impacts. In relation to impacts,
two opposing views have emerged which can be characterised as the ‘liberation
technology’ vs. ‘repression technology’ perspectives.

The liberation technology perspective (Diamond 2010) has been the more dominant.
It recognises a set of key affordances that ICTs provide for social movements:
dramatically lowering the cost of communication, accelerating the diffusion of
information, and transcending barriers of time and space in order to develop collective
identity and mobilise protest (Diani 2000, Leizerov 2000, Elin 2003). This – for
example – empowers citizens living under authoritarian regimes, enabling them to
mobilise together and to attract global support. This creates the basis for a defiance of
state power and then an enactment of political change that would not otherwise have
been possible; with a number of real-world cases cited in which ICTs are argued to
have been fundamental to changes in political regimes e.g. in the Philippines (Castells
et al 2006) and Ukraine (Goldstein 2007).

Three different responses can be identified from authoritarian regimes, which have
emerged over time: rejection, control, and repression. The response was originally
seen in terms of the “dictator’s dilemma”: autocrats know that ICTs are essential to
economic development in their countries but that the technology will also facilitate
political protest (Hachigian 2002).

Some therefore chose to largely reject the

technology; not allowing it to be used, or allowing data processing but not
communication.

As this type of electronic isolationism became harder to sustain, some regimes would
allow diffusion of ICTs but with restrictions and controls imposed on their usage.
This might include the blocking of particular communication channels (e.g. North
Korea largely permitting only in-country communications), or the blocking of
particular websites (as in China), or filtering out of particular communications
4

(Kalathil & Boas 2003, Morozov 2011). This might happen continuously, or might
only be imposed during times of political tension, e.g. cutting off services during civil
unrest (Robertson 2011).

These reactive strategies would generally exist alongside the monitoring of electronic
communications, which represent a first step towards a more proactive and repressive
stance by regimes (Kalathil & Boas 2001). In these situations, states make use of esurveillance to gather evidence that is used to repress their opponents. But they also
actively use ICTs for repressive purposes: disseminating propaganda inside and
outside the country; hacking into the websites of internal social movements and the
email/mobile accounts of organisers; planting disinformation into social movements’
communications; using viruses and other tools of cyberwarfare to attack political
challengers (ibid., Karlekar & Cook 2009). This “repression technology” literature
thus stands in opposition to the liberation technology claims, and presents evidence
that the dictator’s dilemma is solved: ICTs can be simultaneously harnessed for
economic growth and political restraint. ICTs may also be seen as repressive if they
enable the hatred and fundamentalism of “bad civil society” (Lunat 2008, Chambers
& Kopstein 2011).

Alongside these contrasting positions about the political impacts associated with
ICTs, there are contrasting views on the causes of those impacts which can be
characterised as the ‘technological determinist’ vs. ‘social determinist’ perspectives.
The former is much the more dominant and assumes that it is technology which
constructs society and, hence, which should be seen as the prime cause of the types of
impacts just described (Winner 2003). Although stronger in the simplicities of public
statements such as by politicians (e.g. Hillary Clinton cited in BBC 2011), this has
still been a current within much of the literature.

Mainly associated with the

liberation technology perspective that can reduce the complexity of social movements
to the functionalities and appropriateness of the technology that accompanies those
movements (e.g. Castells 2001, Shirky 2011), it is also found in repression technology
discussions (e.g. Morozov 2009).

Socially-deterministic perspectives on ICTs and social movements are less prevalent,
but are reflected in work drawing from a sociological perspective and from ideas on
5

the social construction of technology. These see the context and structures of ICTenabled social movements as most relevant in explaining the outcomes seen (Salter
2003, Luke 2006). The differences in those contexts and structures help explain why
different outcomes are seen in different situations involving the same digital
technologies.
These perspectives on cause and effect – summarised in Figure 1 – of course represent
relatively extreme statements of position, and stereotypes which are readily critiqued
(not least by the mirror image positions). The typical resolution to the dualisms of
both cause and effect, and to their critiques, would be a socio-technical compromise,
which recognised a multiplicity of political outcomes; as represented by the central
position in Figure 1. Such resolution has not been quite as easy as it sounds because
debates have had a tendency to become polarised rather than converging (Diani &
McAdam, 2003). But we can recognise a rich literature that encompasses both the
positive and negative associated with ICTs and social movements, and which brings
together both social and technical elements (e.g. Cammaerts 2005, Chadwick 2006,
Drezner 2010, Golkar 2011).
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Optimism
(“It will be
good”)
Impacts
Associated
With ICTs
Mixed
(“It will be
good and
bad”)

Pessimism
(“It will be
bad”)

Strong grassroots
movements can create or
use ICTs tools that will
help their cause

Twitter Revolution /
Liberation technology:
ICTs bring about
democratic change under
authoritarian rule

ICTs offer a polemical
space where different
ideas and values are
contested

Repression technology: ICTs
deepen social control by
dictatorship, and accelerate
development of ‘bad’ civil
society such as terrorists and
cybercriminals
Technological
determinism
(ICTs cause…)

Authoritarian regimes will
control ICTs and prevent
use by civil society
Socio-technical
contingency
(It depends…)

Social determinism
(Society causes…)

Causes Of Impacts Associated With ICTs

Figure 1: Literature Views on ICTs and Social Movements (adapted from Heeks 2002)

While acknowledging the significant value and contribution of this literature –
dominant narratives, counter-positions, attempted resolutions – it can be noted that
there are still some broader criticisms which have been levelled. These suggest we
should not abandon the search for other perspectives (McAdam et al 2001, Jasper
2002, Della Porta & Diani 2006, Nielsen 2009, Rahimi 2011):


Much of the literature has rather limited explicit conceptualisation, tending to
review and describe case examples rather than build from a clear theoretical
foundation.



The technology is typically recognised as an enabler that changes some of the
landscape within which social movements operate. But it is still treated as
separate from society despite the increasing blurring of boundaries between the
technical and the social.



There tends to be a relatively simple association of cause and effect, despite the
complexity of elements at play within the workings of modern social movements.
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Agency has tended to be underplayed in favour of broader social or technological
factors in explaining outcomes, with technology portrayed only as a tool rather
than being seen to play any active role.



The literature is seen to focus either on the initial causes of ICT-enabled social
movements or, more often, on their political outcomes, rather than seeking to
explain the process and dynamics of those social movements.

So, while not seeking to substitute for the work that has already been done, there do
appear to be grounds for supplementing the current literature. That supplement could
come from a number of directions but here we make use of actor-network theory
(ANT). There have been a few applications of ANT within the social movement
literature, which show its potential in understanding movement formation (e.g.
Routledge 2008, Ernstson 2011). In specific relation to ICTs and social movements,
it appears that ANT has been just occasionally used as part of a general
conceptualisation that demonstrates its potential relevance, rather than directly being
applied as a core analytical frame (e.g. Nielsen 2009, Zheng & Zhang 2011).

Space is too limited here to provide an exposition of ANT, for which readers must be
referred elsewhere (e.g. Latour 2005). However, we can note within its foundational
ideas (e.g. Latour 1999, 2005) the potential to move beyond the dualisms and to
provide a fresh perspective on some of the broader criticisms described above:


While acknowledging the complexity of ANT, the different streams of ideas
within it, and the question mark over its status as a theory (Mol 2010) we can say
that it does provide a conceptualisation of the world.



Its principle of free association rejects any a priori distinction between the social
and the technological/natural (Callon 1986, Tatnall & Gilding 1999).



Traditional notions of cause and effect are largely rejected, with the social and
technological identified more as what is caused or “as interactional effects rather
than primitive causes” (Law 1992).



ANT sees a world full of actors and its principles of agnosticism and generalised
symmetry treat human and non-human actors as categorically equivalent; focusing
on how these actors join together in a series of processes of association and
translation that create heterogeneous networks (Callon 1986, Law & Callon 1988).
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From this perspective, then, social networks are hybrid and contingent
associations of human and non-human elements that are in constant flux, with
ANT not seeking to uncover causes or effects but spotlighting the dynamic
processes of collective action reflected in network formation, growth, dissolution,
etc.

As a particular means of analysis, we take a well-trodden path within information
systems of looking at translation – the means by which dispersed actors mobilise,
connect, juxtapose and hold together in heterogeneous associations (Law 1992) – and
in particular, Callon’s (1986) four “moments of translation” which may be seen in the
flux of networks over time:


Problematisation: particular actors (seen as a “focal actor”) position themselves as
indispensable, by defining the route from current problems to future goals in terms
of an “obligatory passage point” (OPP) through which all actors must pass.



Interessement: focal actors try to convince other actors to accept the roles and
relations they are assigned, by imposing themselves and strengthening other actors
via devices that they suggest.



Enrolment: focal actors put the roles and relationship they established in
interessement into action with a set of negotiation techniques which might include
physical violence, seduction, persuasion, transaction or consent without
discussion.



Mobilisation: focal actors ensure their legitimacy and become spokespeople for
collectives they represent without betraying their allies.

When observed through the moments of translation, social movements therefore
become a constant flux of power: endless attempts to connect and influence other
actors (whether they are human or non-human) to join and follow the movement; or to
betray the movement and detach or join other networks.

3. Methodology
The methodology adopted in order to answer our core research question – “from an
actor-network perspective, what role do ICTs play in the development of a social
movement network?” – was qualitative. We selected a single case study design which
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allows for in-depth analysis over time (Stake 1995) and which has been argued as
particularly suitable for ANT-based research (Greener 2011).

Our specific case study was the Green Movement in Iran, which came to prominence
as a protest against contested presidential election results in June 2009. Iran has
experienced significant diffusion of ICTs since 2000, is particularly active in the
sphere of social media, and has seen ICTs used as an important arena for political
activism (Rahimi 2008). The Green Movement itself has been identified as one of the
largest actions of civil resistance utilising ICTs but one which is also representative
of other recent actions such as those of the Arab Spring (Golkar 2011).

The Green Movement has been very well documented already as a social movement
with an annotated bibliography (Forte 2009), with subsequent analytical books and
articles (Dabashi 2011, Golkar 2011), text and audio-visual resources available from
news organisations and blogs, and with directly-posted resources from Iranian citizens
on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc. In order to produce the case study that follows,
we have triangulated from all of these sources, taking as our time frame the period
just before the election in May 2009 to June 2010, the first anniversary of the Green
Movement.

4. Case Study of ICTs and Iran’s Green Movement
Figure 2 summarises Iran’s political system since the 1979 Islamic revolution with the
country’s Supreme Leader being the most powerful element but with the country’s
President also having significant power (Bruno 2008). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was
first elected President in 2005 against a more moderate and reformist candidate but
with a disappointing level of turnout. That disappointment led to a reaction which
particularly targeted ICTs and the mass media.
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Figure 2: Iran’s political system (Rapp 2009)

56% of Iranians are aged under 25. The country also has high youth unemployment,
relatively high levels of education and literacy, strong ICT diffusion, and state control
of television, radio and print media (CIA 2012). Not surprisingly, this combination
led the Internet to become a forum for political debate and even dissent, with young
Iranians especially keen on blogging (Razzaghi 2011). Using Internet-based media
individuals were able to mobilise around particular issues such as women’s rights
(Ameripour et al 2010). Although never seen as likely to unseat Ahmadinejad’s
regime, the political threat posed by this new forum was recognised and from 2005
onwards more restrictions were put in place with online activists being jailed and the
regime setting up filtering and surveillance technologies (OpenNet Initiative 2009,
CBS 2010).
As the June 2009 election approached – in which Ahmadinejad was seeking reelection - the Ministry of Information and Communication started to throttle Internet
speed down to 128 kilobytes per second, but the Ahmadinejad campaign also sought
to make use of ICTs.

A first live presidential debate was held and shared on

YouTube, Ahmadinejad created a Facebook page, and supporters were encouraged to
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use social media to promote his candidacy, disseminate information about rallies, etc
(Sreberny & Khiabany 2011).

Despite the restrictions, the Internet also became a main space for other candidates.
One campaign – supporting Mir-Hossein Mousavi – was particularly active; adopting
the colour green as a unifying emblem that supporters used in profile pictures, images,
videos, etc that were shared online. Members of the Iranian diaspora also participated
via the Internet, and the use of ICTs started to attract the attention of foreign media
(Hodge 2009). Mousavi rallies were organised in part via social networking and their
large turnouts led the government to starting blocking key websites (Kahtami 2009).
It is at this point in proceedings that we begin our analysis through the lens of
moments of translation.1

4.1 Problematisation
Mousavi’s election campaign started to make visible a potential network of dispersed
actors. Realisation of that network’s potential began when the 12th June election
result was announced, indicating that Ahmadinejad had been re-elected with 63% of
the vote. Many in Iran did not believe this result and felt it to be fraudulent. Some of
them took to the streets in protest, and we will identify these protestors as our focal
actor; an actor that sought to frame the goals and problems of other actors in their own
terms, as we will describe next.2

The protestors are a diverse group but generally seen as dominated by middle-class,
urban, well-educated youths. Their goals were sometimes rather unclear but clustered
around a more democratic polity within Iran which they saw the current political
system as preventing. Their immediate problems were with the election result, which
they believed to be rigged, and by association the regime it had maintained in power:
typical slogans were “Where is my vote?” and “Down with the dictator”.
1

Although triangulated from many sources, this ANT-based analysis particularly uses the following,
which will not be continuously cited in the text: Alexanian 2009; Forte 2009; Ghorashi & Boersma
2009; Gerecht et al. 2010; Gheidary 2010; Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri 2010; Naghibi 2011;
Sreberny & Khiabany 2011.
2
As with all ANT-based accounts, we have had to set a limit on the number of actors included. For
example, there are other actors who at times associated themselves with the protest actor-network; such
as Western governments and Western citizens. But their involvement was somewhat at arms-length or
short-lived and we have chosen to talk largely about those actors who became more actively aligned
with the protestors.
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Reformist leaders in Iran included not just Mousavi and his coterie but others such as
the other reformist candidate Mehdi Karroubi and former President Mohammad
Khatami who had earlier withdrawn from the election and endorsed Mousavi. Their
goal was election of a reformist leadership, with the claimed lack of enough votes
being the main obstacle to realisation.

Of course the declared election result

represented a key problem for them.

Estimates of the size of the Iranian diaspora vary between one and four million
(Hakimzadeh 2006), with particular concentrations in North America, Europe and the
Middle East.

The majority are those who left the country following the 1979

revolution or their children. They tend to be opposed to Iran’s current political
dispensation and want change. Given their position, a main focus will be on seeking
support for change within their host nation – e.g. by translating articles, contacting the
media, undertaking advocacy – and a main obstacle has been generating sufficient
political momentum within their new home nations. There are strong divisions within
a group that consists of many religious faiths and of leftists, reformists, nationalists,
monarchists and more (Slavin 2010). This has made it hard to develop a unified focus
for change but the 2009 election result clearly presented a problem that many in the
diaspora acknowledged.

The international media of TV, radio and print have an ultimate goal of disseminating
newsworthy material that will attract public attention. They face a main obstacle in
the lack of such material, especially in regard to material from foreign countries.
They had been covering the Iranian election but at first struggled to raise the profile of
the event, and then struggled post-election as the Ahmadinejad regime started to
harass, arrest and intimidate foreign journalists based in Tehran (Addis 2009).

Finally, the ICTs themselves have a goal of processing and communicating data, with
their main obstacle being the ambivalence and at times antipathy of the Iranian
regime; a regime which has significant control over the ICT infrastructure. As seen,
the regime had begun to interfere with ICTs’ ability to achieve its goals pre-election,
and this continued post-election e.g. with mobile/SMS coverage being periodically
cut.
13
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Figure 3: Problematisation just after Iranian election

With the actors, goals and obstacles identified, we can also see how protestors were –
at least temporarily – able to translate the paths of those actors and identify their
electoral protest movement as an obligatory passage point for achievement of goals;
as summarised in Figure 3. For reformists and the diaspora, the protest movement is
the only viable means to attract the mass support necessary for political change. For
the diaspora and the international media, the movement represents the only apparent
way to attract public attention. For ICTs, the movement provides a means for them to
continue to perform digital functions which the regime seeks to deny them.

4.2 Interessement
The presence of this social movement of protest in Iran has offered various actors a
single way forward which in theory enables them to circumvent current obstacles and
achieve their goals. But the focal actors must now get the other actors to engage with,
and commit to this course of action. They will do this through devices that seek to
lock that commitment in place, blocking the actors from alternative courses of action.
For all the other actors, those alternatives certainly exist – reformist leaders and the
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diaspora could accept the result and look to 2013 elections when Ahmadinejad can no
longer stand; the international media could look elsewhere for stories, ICTs can
choose to work only for the regime or not to work at all.

A key device was the act of protest which served to frame Iranian politics in
Manichean terms. Shades of grey and compromise routes disappeared in a situation
in which other actors were either with the protestors or against them and with the
regime. Faced with this framing, reformist leaders, members of the diaspora and
some ICTs felt they had little choice but to accept connection with the protest
movement; something in which they were joined by many ordinary citizens who were
now drawn into the category of ‘protestor’.

The protests also provided graphic

imagery and narrative that persuaded the international media not to look elsewhere.
Use of the colour green was another device. Originally Mousavi’s campaign colour, it
was widely adopted by the protestors as a material confirmation of their
problematisation. Not only did this help lock Mousavi and his leadership into the
protest movement, it provided a continuous focus on the protestors’ goals and a means
to lower the barriers to association with the identity of the actor-network. Members of
the diaspora and – more importantly – Iranian citizens, could declare their identity by
wearing green (and without having to physically join in street protests). ICTs could
also readily assume the identity of a protestor by disseminating green as a colour for
social networking sites and other websites.

And protest images were a device of interessement, with the following process being
typical (Gheidary 2010). During the protests and particularly when key incidents
occurred, protestors took video or photo images on their mobile phones. These were
then posted onto social networking sites whenever Internet access became available.
Those images could then be disseminated to other protestors and to the Iranian
diaspora, and then be available for broadcast by the international media. They served
to heighten the definition of protestors as democratic underdogs on the side of good;
the regime as authoritarian tyrants on the side of evil.
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4.3 Enrolment
Problematisation presented a set of theoretical ideas and interessement developed
devices that framed the validity of those ideas; defining actors, identities, interests,
problems and solutions. However, until these are put into action, it is uncertain
whether each actor will actually follow these ideas and take on defined roles and
relations. Enrolling other actors into practice, therefore, becomes a series of tests and
negotiations with each of the other actors (Callon 1986).

At first, enrolment appeared to be successful with the acts of protest and other devices
creating a social movement actor-network. These were the biggest protests since the
1979 revolution. They involved tens of thousands of people gathering almost every
day for two weeks, with hundreds of thousands more aligning themselves with the
Green Movement and entering themselves into the category of ‘protestor’. Reformist
leaders risked exclusion to the political wilderness if they failed this test, and most
chose to become part of the actor-network; declaring their support although calling for
non-violence (BBC 2009). The diaspora also recognised what might be a once-in-alifetime moment for political change. Members readily adopted the assigned role of
international mouthpiece and supporter, with many staging protests of their own.
Other actors also enrolled, though with more difficulty. ICTs’ assigned role was as
channel for organisation, recording and dissemination of the social movement’s
actions and ideas, but it found it difficult to enact this due to the regime’s access
restrictions. One successful negotiation was the agreed use of proxy software, which
allowed some access to social networking sites and other websites via proxy servers
(Christensen 2009).

Others sought to enrol oppositional ICTs – those hosting

government and pro-Ahmadinejad information – by hacking them and substituting
protest-related materials (Moscaritolo 2009).

The international media was persuaded to fulfil its role as global broadcaster and
political lever by being continuously provided with suitable material. While this was
hard to obtain from Tehran-based journalists, ICTs provided the means for ongoing
enrolment via Twitter (with key accounts such as Persiankiwi and Mousavi1388 being
picked up by media such as the New York Times and Daily Telegraph), via blog
accounts (with some protestors switching to writing in English so foreign media could
16

use their material), and through photo/video imagery. One particular image – the
amateur footage showing the death of Neda Agha-Soltan on 20 June after being shot
by a government militiaman – was rapidly and widely circulated and broadcast
(Ravitz 2009).

These actions and materials constitute a series of continuous micro-negotiations that
helped keep all key stakeholders enrolled into what now appeared to be an important,
global social movement. Protestors, reformist politicians, diaspora members, ICTs
and mass media all had a defined role which they were agreeing to fulfil. Indeed,
during the first two weeks, the network appeared to be so strong and sizeable that
others were drawn in. The US State Department for example became more vocal in
its expressed concerns about the election results. It reportedly asked Twitter to delay
a planned upgrade which might affect Iranian access to the service (Pleming 2009),
and supported development of Haystack: software designed to bypass Iranian
government monitoring and censorship (Schleifer 2009).

4.4 Regime Attempts at De-Enrolment
Despite all this positive evidence of network formation and enrolment, there were
other dynamics in play that sought to challenge the social movement. The Iranian
regime itself is typically black-boxed as a homogeneous entity but – as Figure 2
indicates – it is an actor-network of some size and diversity. At times, it seemed as if
the black box might open up and reveal that diversity, with differences in tone and
emphasis in the reaction to protest, and with disagreements and uncertainties apparent
between its various constituent actors.
That this did not happen came in part from the regime’s ability to attack and weaken
the counter-network that had emerged around the protest movement.

One de-

enrolment tactic was a relentless association of the social movement with Western
powers. This was made easier because of the transnational nature of the protest
movement with the involvement of the diaspora in the USA and Europe, the role of
foreign media, and of Western-developed ICTs: Facebook, Twitter, Google, etc (Time
2009). Sensitivities about the West in Iran had restrained Western governments from
clearly joining the protest actor-network, but the regime continued to associate the
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protestors with foreign powers. Some were charged on that basis as Western spies
seeking to undermine Iranian national security (Worth & Fathi 2009).
The reformist leaders – more followers than leaders of the protest movement – were
targeted for intimidation that included arrests and violence and death threats (with
Mousavi’s nephew shot and killed by security forces during a protest towards the end
of 2009 (Fletcher 2009)). Some members of the diaspora were directly affected when
relatives who still remained in Iran were threatened by the Iranian state (Fassihi
2009).

The international media were courted with alternative messages: not just obvious proAhmadinejad propaganda but stories about protestor violence and also more subtle
variants which did find a wider audience, such as those showing how the unrest in
Iran was disrupting ordinary people’s lives (CNN 2009). As noted, ICTs were subject
to continuous attempts to make access difficult: shutting down mobile or Internet
communications from time-to-time and also blocking proxy servers once their details
were shared on Twitter (Christensen 2009). The government also sought to subvert
ICTs’ role within the counter-network through various acts: placing pro-government
messages on protestor social networking sites, hacking protestor accounts, and placing
contradictory messages about the timing and location of planned protests, or about
incidents that occurred during protests (Moscaritolo 2009).

4.5 Attempted Mobilisation and Disintegration
Mobilisation of a protest social movement means, in actor-network terms, that each
actor accepts its own representatives, and that those representatives are in effect
silenced by having the focal actor speak on behalf of the entire network (Callon
1986). The focal actor is thus determinant of what the whole network wants, is and
does. But the ability of the Iranian protestors to mobilise the social movement in this
sense was severely challenged.

First, the nature of the protestors as actor-network was problematic. This was not a
formal, long-formed network with strong connections but an ad hoc, relativelyspontaneous one. Alongside a core committed to fundamental political change were a
much larger penumbra who could contingently be enrolled but as readily de-enrolled.
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This was a structure that ICT was essential to enabling and which has been seen in
other recent Middle East protests (Hassan 2012): decentralised, flexible and without
formal representatives. Such an actor-network could readily continue operating if
individual components were attacked or removed by the regime. But this loose
structure weakened the depth of translation of interests and identities within the
protestors, and weakened the ability of the protestors to translate the interests and
identities of other actors in practice.

As noted above, the regime used the nature of the broader actor-network to challenge
the representativeness of the focal actor protestors. Where the protestors portrayed
themselves as representing a disenfranchised majority of Iranian citizens, the regime
portrayed them as channels for Western governments, influenced by Western media
and Western technology. This weakened their ability to mobilise as representatives of
other actors. Reformist leaders were placed in a difficult position – knowing that
association with the West would be politically very damaging, and thus having to
maintain some distance from the protest network. These actions also worked on the
contingently-enrolled penumbra of local citizens, leading some to reject the identity of
‘protestor’.

Utilisation of Internet-based ICTs for the translation of these local citizens was
relatively limited compared to more traditional tools such as phone or door-knocking
(Schectman 2009). ICTs were of greater relevance in attempting to interesse and
enrol the other actors. But those other actors were heterogeneous, fragmented and
themselves lacking agreed representatives: as described above, the diaspora is a
collective noun covering a multitude of religious and political views. The reformists
varied in their views about the outcomes they sought and would not all unite under
Mousavi’s leadership (Gooya 2009). Neither the international media nor ICTs have
any single leader or agreed representative.

As a result, not only was it impossible to fully mobilise this actor-network but deenrolment was relatively easy to achieve. The regime’s actions rarely led to highprofile de-enrolment of actors dissociating themselves from the social movement. It
more often led to less visible departures from the network: protestors, politicians and
diaspora members silenced by threats, arrests or serious violence; the de-enrolment of
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ordinary citizens who no longer counted themselves as protestors and who came –
perhaps begrudgingly and temporarily – to accept the status quo. And it led to a
loosening of associations: reformist leaders calling for an end to street protest in
favour of more peaceful actions, and the attention of the international media turning
away from Iran following the death of Michael Jackson and never returning in
strength thereafter (Ali 2009, Wold 2012).
Because of these challenges – the loose organisational structure of the protestors,
challenges to their representativeness, lack of representation within other actors, and
the strength of alternative translations on offer – the protestors were never able to
fully mobilise this social movement actor-network. Media attention moved on, ICTs
agreed to play a dual role for both regime and protestors, reformist leaders accepted
compromise, ordinary citizens who had been involved disengaged, and there were
disagreements between protestors and members of the diaspora (MacFarquhar 2010).
Simultaneously any initial opening up of the regime actor-network subsided. It closed
once again and mobilised around the Ahmadinejad presidency (Glendinning &
Siddique 2009).

The broader actor-network disintegrated, leaving a much smaller and still loose
alliance that went into a period of “soul-searching and re-grouping” as from 2010
(Milani 2010).

20

4.6 Summary
Figure 4 summarises the trajectory of this social movement actor-network.

Problematisation

Interessement

Protesters
define
the need for regime
change,
and
establish the social
movement as the
OPP that other
actors must pass
through to achieve
their goals

Devices – mass
demonstrations, the
colour
green,
images of protest –
create a shared
identity and focus
on the OPP: the
social movement

Contingent
Enrolment

Failed
Mobilisation

Protests and ICT
images create an
alliance of active
actors inside and
outside Iran, but
many in the alliance
are susceptible to
de-enrolment

Protestors unable to
represent
or
mobilise network,
other actors start to
de-enrol,
regime
change does not
occur, and broader
social
movement
disintegrates

Weakening the network

Regime De-enrolment Actions
Killings, threats, arrests in violent
crackdown aimed at protestors,
reformist leaders and diaspora. Media
provided with alternative narratives.
ICTs blocked, subverted and recruited.
Regime actor-network affirmed and
black-boxed.

Figure 4: Iranian Green Movement moments of translation

5. Conclusions
The question posed initially was this: from an actor-network perspective, what role do
ICTs play in the development of a social movement network?
ANT firstly sees ICTs as playing an actor’s role; attributing interests, identity, agency
to ICTs. In foreshortened accounts of the type necessitated in a paper, there is a
danger that this emerges as little more than a linguistic device that describes
technology in human-like terms. However, this has allowed a treatment of ICTs that
differs from accounts of social movements based on other theorisations. In which the
technology sits not categorically above, below or separate from human actors but
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alongside them with conceptual equivalence. And in which ICTs are not just devices
a social movement uses and interacts with, but an actor that can explain its own
agenda and reasons for associating or not associating with the movement.

ICTs have been seen to play a participatory and facilitating role within the social
movements. They have enabled a global movement to form, permitting the ideas and
actions of the focal protestors to have a much greater influence than might otherwise
be possible. The size, reach and rapidity of formation of this social movement would
not have been achieved without ICTs, and they were central to the translation of other
actors’ ideas and identities; central to the creation and dissemination of an identity of
protest that came to be shared across the network. ICTs provided a flexibility of
translation and a flexibility of network formation; continuing to perform particularly
their global role even when severely challenged by the Ahmadinejad regime.

Yet ICTs can also be seen to have betrayed the social movement in two ways.

Because of their heterogeneity, ICTs could not form a single, represented actor.
Instead, while in part playing the supportive roles defined by the protest network,
ICTs simultaneously undermined that network by playing the role defined by the
regime network: refusing access to the protestors, disseminating false information,
even helping to identify protest activitists. At times, then, ICTs could no longer be a
trusted member of the social movement.

ICTs also offered the social movement rapid but shallow support for actor-network
formation. Translation processes occur more quickly but also more contingently
when undertaken via ICTs (Korac-Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse 2002). There is a
‘distancing’ that limits depth of engagement generally, and a facilitation of multiple
identities and interests that limits depth of engagement with any one network and role
(Murphy 2009).

In all this, there are features of ICT-enabled social movements that can be seen across
the Middle East.

Formation of an actor-network via the first three translation

processes – problematisation, interessement, enrolment – can happen with surprising
speed and scale. Enrolment may be sufficient to topple an existing regime. The
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loose, flexible structure of the network enables it to survive attacks while the regime
continues. But that ICT-enabled structure of an atomised protest movement makes it
hard to mobilise and makes the network fragile at the periphery, with membership
outside the core protestors liable to de-enrol (Etling et al 2010); that de-enrolment
being partly ICT-enabled. One result, as in this case or as seen in countries like
Bahrain, is survival of the existing regime. When there is regime change there may be
emergence of other focal actors based around pre-existing, formal networks – such as
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or Ennahda in Tunisia – who can make better
claims to mobilisation.

Overall, we can say that ICTs were deeply embedded in the dynamics of this social
movement. They played an active role to shape, interact with, enable and undermine
Iran’s Green Movement, demonstrating the complex socio-technical dynamics of
social movements in a digital age. That role stood outside the dualisms identified in
earlier literature. Social movement outcomes were measured not in terms of good or
bad but in terms of network formation, non-formation or dissolution. Causes were not
identified and there was no a priori distinction of the social and the technical: ICTs
themselves were an actor-network with human and non-human components.

In practice, it has been hard to escape duality: an overlain sense from the Western
perspective of the authors of “regime bad, protestors good” and a shorthanded
treatment of ICTs as a technological actor-network.

But these are limitations

introduced by the authors because ANT does stand outside the dualities. It is amoral
(Walsham 1997); offering the researcher no inherent signposts and helping move
away from the “liberal-democratic values inherent in studying social movements in
authoritarian regime” and the value-laded terminology of “liberation” and
“repression” technologies (Deibert & Rohozinski 2010). And it is descriptive of
network dynamics rather than explanatory, thus avoiding any sense of determinism
(Heeks & Stanforth 2007, Law 2007).

This does impose a limitation. ANT has been helpful in exposing the dynamics of
ICT-enabled social movements. It can provide a rich description of how actors come
to join or leave such a movement, but tells us little about why the actors made those
choices or what the implications are of those choices. As previously acknowledged, it
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may therefore be better to regard ANT more as a methodology for study of social
movements than as a theory let alone a critical theory (McNamara et al. 2004,
Andrade & Urquhart 2010), recognising that it may better be used in combination
with supplemental causal and moral frameworks.

Alongside the obvious idea of analysing other cases, this framework addition suggests
a direction for future ANT-based work on ICT-enabled social movements. Other
directions are identifiable from elements we could not address in the current study.
More understanding of social movements under authoritarian regimes could be
derived from switching to analyse the regime as focal actor, including ICTs as an
actor within its network. Methodologically, longitudinal research based on primary
data should provide a deeper understanding than our post hoc, secondary data-based
study. Finally, more could be understood about the technology by selecting ICTs as
an actor-network and opening that network up to understand its constituent actors and
dynamics.
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